# Security Threats to Microsoft Windows XP

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#### Summary

Privacy is the birth-right of a computer user, and it should not be a privilege to only a chosen few. This paper presents security loopholes in Windows XP User Management System and dissection of the SAM file used for storing the passwords using hexa editor followed by an experiment of invading in to some account of Windows XP without knowing the passwords and retrieving back the users profile and desktop features and provide some guidelines for securing the user Security features.

#### Key words:

SAM, Windows XP

#### Notation:

SAM	System Account Manager
LM	Lan Manager
NT	New Technology

#### **1. Introduction**

Everyone in this world today needs some privacy and security. Being the reason, it has become important feature of every operating system, take Linux or Novell or any Microsoft's operating system. Everybody is trying to embed latest security. So it is done in Microsoft windows XP [4]. It gives you a very good feature to create user accounts and assign password to each user account. For security reasons the password are secured using hashing which is stored in SAM file, so that it may not be available to any unknown user so that the normal user can't access the passwords of other users.

Path of SAM File C:\Windows\system32\config

The SAM file appears to be fairly secure. But if physical access to the machine is achieved, it is not so secure. Microsoft has admitted this. If the SAM file is locked, it is not possible to delete/copy/move/rename it within windows via explorer and access to SAM file is also restricted if it is not in the administrator group [5].

The structure of a SAM [13] file is then described, with a byte-by-byte analysis using Hexa Editor, so that its

various features and the storage and security methods employed are made apparent shown in Appendix A.

#### 2. Threats to Microsoft Windows XP

In this paper efforts have been made to show through the experiments, Windows XP has security loopholes and can easily invade into any user accounts of windows XP even if syskey[13] is installed and windows XP can be booted without permission.



#### 2.1 Intrusion into the user accounts of Microsoft windows XP

In this case only formal tool that is required to do this is just a bootable diskette [2]. The user account details are stored in a SAM file in the system32 folder of the windows operating system. It is not known to the programmers that the windows operating systems have left a copy of SAM file in another folder of the windows folder, which doesn't have any user accounts and passwords, except the administrator account with a blank password, which can be used to hack into the system.

The process includes replacing the active SAM file with the backup copy.

Some security features included into the SAM file of any system doesn't allow to simply copy the SAM file from any other system and copying it into the system32, as this can result in a corrupted, unbootable system shown in Appendix B.

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**2.2 Retrieving Back the User profile and Desktop** In this case Windows XP is to be booted without permission, but subsequently the original user profiles can be restored, which would make the detection of intrusion next to impossible. It is another knack of Windows XP that the whole accounts [3] which are deleted, can be completely restored, with their desktop and folder settings intact (unless the files have been messed around with), and the password set to blank

**2.3 Intrusion into the user accounts of Microsoft Windows XP even if the syskey is installed.** In this case you can invade a system even if syskey has been used. Microsoft claims syskey to be a very strong security feature but it also falls flat by replacing some of the backup files. As you already know the syskey uses a checksum of four files present in C:\windows\system32\config

so backing up all these files will break the syskey and the computer will become accessible.

### 3. Measures to Secure SAM File

SAM file has many security threats so there are some guidelines proposed to secure SAM file.

#### 3.1 Use of hashes

Instead of storing your user account password [9] in cleartext, Windows generates and stores user account passwords by using two different password representations, generally known as hashes [11]. When we set or change the password for a user account to a password that contains fewer than 15 characters, Windows generates both a LM hash and a Windows NT hash of the password. These hashes are stored in the local SAM File. The LM hash is relatively weak compared to the NT hash, and it is therefore prone to fast brute force attack. Therefore, we can make Windows stores the stronger NT [13] hash of our password.

#### 3.2 Use of Hardware Locks

Put up the Hardware Locks on cabinet. We know that SAM file is not possible to delete/copy/move/rename within windows via explorer. So we can use hardware locks on cabinet to restrict unauthorized access from using the hardware.

#### 3.3 Use of Bios Passwords

Using Bios Passwords can also be used for securing the system to a good extent. Using supervisor password, we can restrict unauthenticated entry to change the boot sequence. Booting from hard disk is the best booting priority considering the protection of SAM file.

#### 4. Results and Discussion

During the study and experimentation with Windows XP, it has been found that NT hashes passwords are good option for security but it is breakable. Bios passwords may be better option at some extent because it is also breakable by some hacking tools. So hardware locks are best option from unauthorized access to Windows XP

#### 5. Conclusion

It is found that windows XP is not secure from security threats. Hardware locks, and bios setup are some of the ways to add on the security layer to minimize the physical exploitation of the operating system. Bios protection can also be broken by shorting the 1&3 pins of jumper of motherboard or by removing the batteries and reinserting them. So using bios setup with the feature of hardware lock is the best way to secure one's personal computer from any security threat.

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### 7. Author's Profile



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(Haryana), India since Oct. 1993. He has earlier worked as Reader, Computer Sc. & Applications, at Bhopal University, Bhopal from 1985-90. He has supervised five Ph.D.'s in Computer Science and thirteen students are working under his supervision. He has more than 100 publications in International / National Journals and Conferences. He is recipient of 'THE GEORGE OOMAN MEMORIAL PRIZE' for the year 1991-92 and a RESEARCH AWARD –"The Certificate of Merit – 2000" for the paper entitled ESMD – An Expert System for Medical Diagnosis from INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERS, INDIA. His teaching and research activities include Simulation and Modeling, Software Risk Management, Software Reliability, Software testing & Software Engineering processes , Temporal Databases, Ad hoc Networks, Grid Computing , and Biomechanics.



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### Appendix A

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	С	D	E	F		regf; a constant identifier
0000	72	65	67	66	1B	00	00	00	1B	00	00	00	00	40	6D	25	regf <mark></mark>	Twin increment for adding/removing data in
0010	EB	53	BF	01	01	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	<mark>ι ёSί.</mark>	memory;
0020	01	00	00	00	20	00	00	00	00	40	00	00	01	00	00	00		Last disk write - shutdown, logoff and other times; stored NT time format
0030					79				74		65						N.S.y.s.t.e.m.R.	Constants, unsure of; the 2nd one is set to
0040	6F		6F		74						79				74		o.o.t.N.S.y.s.t.	05000000 in default, software, system & userdiff in
0050											43				6E		e.m.3.2.N.C.o.n.	XP.
0060	66	00	69	00	67	00	SC	00	53	00	41	00	4D	00	00	00	f.i.g.N.S.A.M	Length of data section to the end of the last
0070	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		hbin
																		The filename and path, counting backwards
01E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	•••••• <u>••••</u>	Surplus space - nulls or junk
01F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	C6	36	9₿	42	<mark>Æ6šB</mark>	Dword XOR checksum of the first 508 bytes

The hbin entry:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	С	D	Е	F	
3000	68	62	69	6E	00	20	00	00	00	10	00	00	00	00	00	00	hbin
3010	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10	00	00	Either the length of entry or offset to next entry relative to this one. Normally 1000/4069 but
																	can switch between 2000 and 3000 part way
																	through
																	Surplus space - nulls or junk
																	2K Constant? - mostly junk or nulls in XP

The registry appears to be made up of 7 different types of entries: All offsets are relative to 1000, xx denotes no constant identifier

01. nk = (sub)keys (links to the following 4 types)

02. lf/lh = Subkey list

03. xx = Value list (links to type no. 6)

04. sk = Permissions

05. xx = Class information (regedt32 input on key creation)

06. vk = Value (links to type no. 7 though data can be within the value)

07. xx = Data **The nk entry:** 

0	) 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	С	D	Е	F		As above, with this difference:
0000 D8	B FF	FF	FF	6C	68	04	00	48	03	00	00	81	64	C1	55	<mark>Øÿÿÿlh.H</mark> +dÁU	(for checksumed lists)
0010 78		09		45	02	37	00	28	D1	0D	00	BA	7B	02	84	<b>x</b> ◆E.7. <mark>(Ñ</mark> º{,	(for checksunied lists)
0020 00	) E6	0D	00	30	F7	7A	22									.æ <mark>0÷z</mark> ″	The subkeys are: Control, Enum,
																	Hardware Profiles & Services respectfully.

Calculating the checksum: Control = 43,6F,6E,74,72,6F,6C -> 43,4F,4E,54,52,4F,4C (CONTROL) Use calc.exe, view = Scientific, length = Dword  $43 + 4F = 92 + (43 \times 24) = 9FE$ 9FE + 4E = A4C + (9FE x 24) = 17204 17204 + 54 = 17258 + (17204 x 24) = 357AE8 357AE8 + 52 = 357B3A + (357AE8 x 24) = 7BAC3DA 7BAC3DA + 4F = 7BAC429 + (7BAC3DA x 24) = 1DFE4ED1 1DFE4ED1 + 4C = 1DFE4F1D + (1DFE4ED1 x 24) = 55C16481 -> 55,C1,64,81 -> 81,64,C1,55

202

## Appendix B

Г

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	С	D	Ε	F				
0000	Α8	FF	FF	FF	6E	6B	2C	00	00	55	EF	85	BA	60	C1	01	ÿÿÿ	ż <mark>nk</mark> , .	.Uï,	º`Á.
0010	00	00	00	00	F0	03	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		. <mark>ð</mark>		
0020	FO	01	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	00	00	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	ð	ÿÿÿÿ		ÿÿÿÿ
0030	78	00	00	00	FF	FF	$\mathbf{FF}$	FF	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	Х	ўўуў		
0040					00				00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00				<mark></mark>
0050	53	41	4D	00	00	00	00	00									SAM			
			1000		~ ~															
Entr		<b>.</b>				rever	sed	bytes												
nk; a						G	11													
Keyt									odifi	d th	o ko			nad	ar if					
value																100				
								ith 00				any	Subi	xcy c	114112	303				
Subl																				
	•							n 00,0			,									
								n FF,I												
Aud	it and	l per	miss	ions	(sk)	offse	t													
<b>C</b> las	s enti	ry of	fset,	if no	one;	filled	l wit	h FF,	FF,FI	F,FF										
The															),00.					
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The							if no	one; f	illed	with	00,0	)0,00	),00							
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Keyı a null																and				
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		-																		
	name	-	red i	n AS	SCII	form	at.													
	iiii	, 500			. 0.11															

Figure1. Byte wise description of SAM file




Figure2. SubkeyList