

Information and Analytical Support of Anti-Corruption Policy

Anatolii Novak¹, Vitalii Bashtannyk², Oksana Parkhomenko-Kutsevil³, Vasyi Kuybida⁴, Nataliia Kobyzhcha⁵

¹National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine,

²Dnipropetrovsk regional Institute for Public Administration National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine, Dnipro, Ukraine,

³Department of Public Administration of the Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky State Pedagogical University named after Hryhoriy Skovoroda, Pereyaslav, Ukraine,

⁴National academy for public administration under the President of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine

⁵Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine

Summary

The development of technology speeds up the process of obtaining information and its analysis to track the level of corruption in different countries and develop countermeasures. This study examines the role of information and analytical support of anti-corruption policy as a tool for government accountability and analysis, evaluation, combating corruption in Eastern Europe. The purpose of the article is to identify the components of the information-analytical system that help reduce the level of corruption. The research methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of the functioning of information and analytical systems of Ukraine used by anti-corruption bodies. A quantitative analysis of the CPI score was conducted, according to Transparency International, to identify the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies in developing countries. The results show similar trends in countries developing on the effect of the use of information and analytical systems in the implementation of anti-corruption policies, strategies and measures. The strategy to combat corruption mainly involves increasing the independence and powers of anti-corruption bodies. Therefore, the development of information and analytical support is aimed at automating the processes of pre-trial investigations and criminal proceedings, information protection. As a tool for accountability, information and analytical systems may be ineffective due to the abuse of power by higher anti-corruption bodies due to political pressure from elite structures. Restrictions on political will are a major problem for the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies.

Key words:

Information-analytical Support, Anti-corruption Policy, Strategies for Overcoming Corruption, Models of Anti-corruption Strategies.

1. Introduction

Corruption and anti-corruption policies remain a topical issue in research from Asia [1; 2], Africa [3] to the United States [4] and Europe [5]. The development of technology speeds up the process of obtaining information and its analysis to track the level of corruption in different countries and develop countermeasures. For example, the developed information and analytical system of anti-

corruption policy is the practice of diagnosis, evaluation of management and counteraction, the World Bank [6; 4]. Among the main challenges of anti-corruption policy are the lack of strategies to gain the support of key leaders (political forces and the judiciary, institutional failures of anti-corruption reforms due to the inability to adapt old institutions to new conditions. An additional challenge is the lack of government accountability in some countries, especially in developing countries. It is the accountability of the government, which provides the opportunity to obtain information and its unhindered analysis by various stakeholders, to understand the causes of corruption and to develop ways to counter it depending on the political system. Understanding the causes of corruption in different countries is a challenge for developing effective anti-corruption policies, despite the developed and integrated information and analytical systems. As a result, anti-corruption agencies are often ineffective [6].

This study examines the role of information and analytical support of anti-corruption policy as a tool for government accountability and analysis, evaluation, combating corruption in Eastern Europe. The purpose of the article is to identify the components of the information-analytical system that help reduce the level of corruption. Since the political context of anti-corruption policy formation and implementation in each country is unique, it is important to study effective methods of information and analytical support of anti-corruption policy in developing countries, with limited financial resources, transition to market economy, transformation of institutions, development of digital governance, decentralization and privatization [7].

2. Literature review

World Bank researchers have identified the following models of anti-corruption agencies: Universal Model of Hong Kong, Investigative Model of Singapore,

Parliamentary Model of New South Wales, Multi-Agency Model of USA [4]. Agency performance models are costly, for example, the Universal Model of Hong Kong (Independent Commission Against Corruption, ICAC) is a unique body that requires large amounts of funding through effective rigorous methods of combating corruption crimes [7]. Quah classifies anti-corruption models by the presence of a specialized body: 1) the adoption of anti-corruption laws without a special body (an example is the Law on Anti-Corruption that was introduced in Mongolia in April 1996); 2) the functioning of anti-corruption bodies based on the adoption of several laws (India Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), Philippines) [1]. Specialized agencies have been actively developing since the early 1990s, which use repressive or preventive measures against corruption [8; 9]. At the same time, the scientific literature has formed two polar views on the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: 1) the formation of anti-corruption bodies as an effective way to counter; 2) the effectiveness of specialized bodies in terms of governance reform [10]. Creating a minimum political, legal, and socioeconomic environment ensures effective governance and the success of anti-corruption policies [11]. However, in underdeveloped countries with low levels of economic development, agencies are generally ineffective. The activities of anti-corruption agencies or bodies and their anti-corruption strategies may be ineffective due to information asymmetry, lack of resources or institutional inertia (difficulty of changing institutions over time due to low adaptability) [12]. In this context, information and analytical support is an important component of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. Technological solutions and software products can dynamically and timely track information, helping to reduce its asymmetry, reduce the cost of searching for information. In this context, information and analytical support is an important component of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. Technological solutions and software products can dynamically and timely track information, helping to reduce its asymmetry, reduce the cost of searching for information. In this context, information and analytical support is an important component of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy. Technological solutions and software products can dynamically and timely track information, helping to reduce its asymmetry, reduce the cost of searching for information [13; 14].

Political will ensures the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy by determining the authority and adequacy of funding for anti-corruption agencies, including for information and analytical activities [15; 16]. The level of political will is determined by the institutional capacity of anti-corruption agencies, which in turn depends on government support and the level of political interference in their activities, giving them power over anti-corruption actions [15]. The formation of political will occurs through a mechanism of interaction with international organizations

that provide support for public administration reforms, institutions and promote civil society [17]. Analytical support helps to measure the level of political will based on indicators of the level of its expression, intensity, as well as indicators of public support for political will and the results of reforms. Analysis of the experience of combating corruption is the conceptual basis of political will [18]. Empowerment determines the functioning strategy and anti-corruption measures (review, disclosure, notification, warning, etc.). The reliability of partner institutions (courts, prosecutors, customs and tax authorities) is also an important component of an effective anti-corruption policy [19].

Improving the collection and evaluation of information, computerization of anti-corruption services provides improved anti-corruption and anti-fraud [15]. The development of e-democracy provides these processes and contributes to a greater level of effectiveness in combating corruption through the accountability of specialized bodies and the government [20]. For example, the development of a network of federal institutions to ensure accountability during the transition to democracy provides significant benefits in the fight against corruption and the evolution of institutions, transformational reforms in the management of corruption in general [21]. Analytical tools for gathering information on public support for anti-corruption actions by political forces make it possible to show overall confidence in the central authorities, political leaders [12].

3. Methodology

Ukraine's experience was used to assess the level of impact of information and analytical support on the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy in developing countries. Ukraine is making the transition to a market economy, which is characterized by processes of decentralization, privatization, systemic corruption, transformation of public administration and the transition to e-democracy. In addition, the practice of digitalization in the implementation of anti-corruption measures is close to other European countries: Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia. The proximity of anti-corruption counteraction lies in similar strategies to combat money laundering and embezzlement of state assets, lack of sufficient political will as an important component of anti-corruption policy, development of democratic processes and development of civil information society, digital accountability and governance reforms.

The analysis of information and analytical support was carried out based on studying the materials of the international organization Transparency International [22], National Agency on Corruption Prevention [23], National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine [24; 25]. The official websites of Transparency International and anti-corruption

bodies of Ukraine contain information on the development of information-analytical systems and statistics on the effectiveness of anti-corruption (number of proceedings, instructions, explanations, WACS decisions, protocols, public calls of potential corrupt officials). In particular, were analyzed the functional capabilities of the Register of Reports of Political Parties POLITDATA; Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corrupt or Corruption-Related Offenses; Unified State Register of Declarations of Persons Authorized to Perform the Functions of the State or Local Self-Government; NAPC knowledge bases (information units on declaration; conflict of interest; information on anti-corruption commissioners; analysis of the use of public funds; information on whistleblowers; information on corrupt officials). To determine the level of effectiveness of anti-corruption policies and measures used CPI score, 2020, according to the international organization Transparency International. The experience of Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, South, Georgia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Kenya, and Uganda was used to compare the effectiveness of Ukraine's anti-corruption policy with other countries. The dynamics of the CPI score for 2012-2020 for these countries is given.

4. Results

Corruption in Ukraine is a systemic problem at all levels of government that threatens confidence in government and political stability. The theft of government assets by senior officials (for example, a 2011 bribe of \$ 3.7 million, transactions worth \$ 18 million in 2007 and 2014 through a Swedish state customer) are the most discussed scandals in the international community. Income laundering strategies in Ukraine are similar to Turkey's corruption schemes (worth \$ 17.5 million in the gas sector). Such corrupt schemes often lead to increased control over the judiciary and limited accountability of civil servants. Restrictions also apply to reducing the level of monitoring of corruption by international organizations in developing countries (as shown by the scandal in Azerbaijan). Ukraine is in the process of forming anti-corruption infrastructure through the creation of specialized anti-corruption bodies: National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (hereinafter - NAPC, anti-corruption policy, verification of declarations, monitoring and protection), National Anti-Corruption Bureau (preventive measures, counteraction and investigation), Specialized Anti-Corruption the Prosecutor's Office (investigation) and the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court (hereinafter - SACC, Justice). The Prosecutor's Office, the National Police of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation and courts of general jurisdiction facilitate the activities of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. Thus, in Ukraine there is a mixed model of anti-corruption, where there are mostly various specialized

bodies with the division of powers. The division of powers can ensure that the risks of ineffectiveness of investigations and anti-corruption are shared, but that funding for these services can be increased through the remuneration and training of civil servants. The representative office of Transparency International in Ukraine provides the organization of special services and the hiring of qualified personnel. In addition, the Law of Ukraine "On the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court" was updated in accordance with the interests of citizens. Information and analytical support provide for monitoring the activities of the anti-corruption court. The introduction of clear rules and the formation of strong institutions, including an independent anti-corruption court, is the beginning of the development of the rule of law and the emergence of democracy. The SACC's activities began with several convictions.

The constraining factors of anti-corruption policy are the ongoing reform of the judiciary, launched in 2016, which will last at least until 2022. The legal framework on liability for false reporting of income by declarants needs to be updated. Achievements in public procurement are also affected. The ProZorro platform (electronic procurement system) as an innovative system for monitoring the procurement of public institutions to combat money laundering and corruption is also under pressure. The powers of the SACC are excessive, as evidenced by the decision of the SACC to revoke the authority of the NAPC to verify the declarations of officials of October 28, 2020, to close the register of assets of civil servants to the public. As a result, 560 criminal proceedings for income declaration were suspended and 34 cases referred to the HAC were closed [23]. This means reducing the level of political will due to political pressure from the authorities and exceeding the SACC's own powers, limiting accountability to the public, and suspending democratic processes. Similar processes have taken place in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite the adoption of anti-corruption laws through the undermining of national interests by powerful private entities [26]. Geopolitical interests and values of developed countries influence the course of anti-corruption policy. Weak democracy remains a deterrent to overcoming such influence. The political transition to democracy hinders the progress of anti-corruption reforms due to the constant pressure of elite structures. Due to this, the strong legal base of Ukraine and the formed infrastructure for the implementation of the policy have limited law enforcement. Weakness of the public in terms of control and access to information has a negative impact on the accountability of specialized bodies and civil servants. These problems can be solved by strengthening accountability and transparency in the management of public assets, further development of public procurement, ensuring the capacity and independence of the anti-corruption court, a professional independent judiciary. Ukraine CPI score (Figure 1) remains with a minimum level

of progress (in 2020 - 3.3, in 2015 the index was 27, in 2012 - 26). Ukraine is among the group of Eastern European countries with the highest level of vulnerability to corruption. This indicates the weakness of political institutions and the limitation of the political will of anti-corruption bodies. Authoritarian rule, particularly under the influence of stronger countries, threatens the development of democracy and the implementation of anti-corruption policies. The system of counteracting and deterring corruption is ineffective. Authoritarian rule, particularly under the influence of stronger countries, threatens the development of democracy and the implementation of anti-corruption policies. The system of counteracting and deterring corruption is ineffective. Authoritarian rule, particularly under the influence of stronger countries, threatens the development of democracy and the implementation of anti-corruption policies. The system of counteracting and deterring corruption is ineffective.




Fig.1. Ukraine CPI score, 2020

Information and analytical support within the anti-corruption strategy aimed at improving the work, independence of specialized anti-corruption bodies, provides for monitoring the activities of civil servants through the following registers:

Register of reports of political parties POLITDATA (Unified State Register of reports of political parties on property, income, expenses and liabilities of a financial nature) in order to track sources of funding for political forces.

Unified state register of persons who have committed corruption or corruption-related offenses. Unified state register of declarations of persons authorized to perform the functions of the state or local self-government.

NAPC knowledge bases contain the following sections: declaration; conflict of interest; information on anti-

corruption commissioners; prevention of political corruption to analyze the use of public funds; information on whistleblowers; information about corrupt officials.

The amount of budget funds (general fund) allocated for the activities of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine in 2017-2021 is growing (Table 1). Consumption expenditures in the structure of costs and wages predominate, while development expenditures are declining.

Table 1: The amount of budget funds (general fund) of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2017-2021

Indicators	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Growth, %
In total, UAH million	773,56	857,09	867,50	1038,14	1065,80	37,78%
consumption expenditures	648,94	733,92	761,38	957,29	1000,00	54,10%
wages	411,15	472,05	514,67	682,53	760,93	85,07%
utilities and energy	8.76	8.09	5.63	8.00	7.80	-10,87%
development costs	124.62	123.18	106.12	80.85	65.80	-47,20%

The activities of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau include investigating and combating corruption. The efficiency of the activity is confirmed by the amount of compensated losses in criminal proceedings, which exceeded UAH 1.14 billion in 2020. The total economic effect of the functioning of anti-corruption bodies reached UAH 1.93 billion. This means that there are no financial constraints, and agencies and bodies can finance their own activities. Agency revenues include compensation for corruption offenses, bail for suspects who have violated their responsibilities, and other transfers to the budget [24]. Support for the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine in 2020 ensured the introduction of an interagency information and telecommunications system (ITS) for the pre-trial investigation of eCase MS by the National Bureau. ITS provides increased efficiency of detectives and analysts. European partners financially support the implementation of infrastructure IT projects: data warehouses and automated data collection system (information broker). NABU detectives are involved in the development and implementation of projects to improve criminal justice, among which are "Standards of pre-trial investigation." The standards are a guide for investigators and prosecutors with a mobile application that has been in operation since November 2020. Procedural actions of investigative bodies are automated with the help of the project "Procedural interview". The International Renaissance Foundation supports IT solutions. Interaction with partners, international organizations and public accountability in 2020 is due to online formats. Citizens apply to the National

Bureau through electronic means of communication, which automates the processing of requests and speeds up the processes of interaction and accountability. In 2020, NABU joined the System of Electronic Interaction of Executive Bodies to optimize correspondence processes. Thus, information and analytical support of activities occurs through technological solutions and information systems of interaction with various stakeholders, both internal (interdepartmental units, various anti-corruption policy bodies) and external (partners, international organizations and the public, business). The accountability of anti-corruption bodies has increased significantly.

The National Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office have moved to the processes of experimental operation of the interdepartmental information and telecommunication system of the pre-trial investigation eCase MS. More than 70% of detectives and prosecutors tested typical scenarios of criminal proceedings and confirmed the readiness of the technological solution for use in practice. eCase MS guarantees the security of information transmission and processing in accordance with the examination of the information security system. NABU detectives and SAP prosecutors enter information and information about real criminal proceedings into the system, but the paper document circulation functions in parallel. The European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine (EUACI) funds ECase MS. The full transition of anti-corruption bodies (NABU, SAP, WACS) to the electronic form of criminal proceedings must be approved by the relevant regulations and amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. However, the implementation of eCase MS is a challenge for NABU and other institutions and public authorities. Among the main limitations are technical (the need to train the functions of the system of all stakeholders), financial (ongoing funding of technical tasks). However, a number of eCase MS features justify these limitations: online document management, electronic pre-trial investigation management, timeline reminders, integration of document exchange with other document management systems, role model access to the system, analysis of criminal process management data and reports e-documents for participants in criminal proceedings, automated filling of templates of procedural documents, a single space for planning pre-trial investigation of detectives and prosecutors, information protection. Among the main advantages of eCase MS are the automation of investigation processes; reduction of printing and

forwarding costs; standardization of forms of procedural documents; reduction of investigation time; rapid exchange of documents between anti-corruption bodies; qualitative new analytics for management decisions [25].

The practice of developing and implementing information and analytical systems to automate the work of anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine shows a new digital approach to the routine duties of detectives and prosecutors. As a result of digitalization, the level of accountability to stakeholders is increasing due to the availability of data on corruption violations to the public. These processes lead to the development of democracy in Ukraine, but the insufficient level of political will of anti-corruption bodies and the pressure of the ruling elite on the activities of anti-corruption services limits the fight against corruption. Ukraine CPI score proves the identified limitations.

5. Discussion

The Bureau of Investigation of Corruption Practices (CPIB) of Singapore and the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong are more effective due to a greater level of political will of governments and political assistance in investigating corruption crimes (i.e. higher funding and authority) [16]. Training programs, anti-corruption information campaigns, which accordingly required large amounts of funding, ensured efficiency [15]. The centralization and political power of agencies in Hong Kong, Singapore, and China also explain their effectiveness [11; 12]. In Singapore, the anti-corruption body is effective in part due to its long history and the evolution of anti-corruption [27]. It is due to the developed economy that financing such a model of anti-corruption activities has not been a problem for Hong Kong [15]. The development of models for the functioning of anti-corruption agencies in Botswana and Madagascar, following the example of the Hong Kong ICAC model (Directorate for Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) and the Office for Independent Anti-Corruption (BIANCO), has significantly reduced corruption and made significant progress [7]. In contrast, the establishment of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission in Indonesia, based on the Hong Kong model, did not provide a similar effect due to the low level of governance, but a number of measures proved effective due to the support and trust of citizens [10].

Table 2: CPI score in developing countries, 2012-2020

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Growth, +/-
Singapore	87	86	84	85	84	84	85	85	85	-2
Hong Kong	77	75	74	75	77	77	76	76	77	0
Korea, South	56	55	55	54	53	54	57	59	61	5
Georgia	52	49	52	52	57	56	58	56	56	4
China	39	40	36	37	40	41	39	41	42	3

Indonesia	32	32	34	36	37	37	38	40	37	5
Thailand	37	35	38	38	35	37	36	36	36	-1
Ukraine	26	25	26	27	29	30	32	30	33	7
Kenya	27	27	25	25	26	28	27	28	31	4
Uganda	29	26	26	25	25	26	26	28	27	-2
Average	46,2	45	45	45,4	46,3	47	47,4	47,9	48,5	2,3
Standard deviation	21,4	21,2	20,7	20,9	20,9	20,3	20,6	20,3	20,2	-1,2

The lower level of political will of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NCCC) of Thailand and the Korean Independent Commission against Corruption (KICAC) is reflected in insufficient funding. Other examples of a lack of funding and investment in anti-corruption are the experiences of Uganda and Kenya, which led to the failure of anti-corruption policies [28]. Restricting the political will of the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia by discrediting, distorting the activities of the agency leads to a potential failure of anti-corruption policy [29]. Thus, various restrictions on political forces lead to the failure of anti-corruption agencies [9; 19]. The unique limitations and problems of the functioning of various anti-corruption bodies cause the ineffectiveness of their powers around the world [30; 31]. The activity is limited to the detection, reporting and consideration of corruption crimes [19]. This is evidenced in particular by the experience of Indonesia, where the measures of the Corruption Eradication Commission to convict those guilty of corruption may be futile due to the intervention of political stakeholders [10].

The level of economic development also determines political will and is directly related to the funding of anti-corruption agencies. Another example is the South African Police Service's (SAPS) anti-corruption unit, the closure of which by the central government system threatens the legitimacy of the government [3]. A similar situation is typical for Ukraine, where the level of GDP per capita determines the lack of political support for anti-corruption measures. The opposite example is Georgia's experience in reforming police forces as the most corrupt since early 2003 [2]. Georgia has provided political assistance in combating corruption through increasing the level of political will, consistent implementation of measures to combat corruption.

6. Conclusion

The study identified similar trends in developing countries regarding the effect of using information and analytical systems in the implementation of anti-corruption policies, strategies and measures. The strategy to combat corruption mainly involves increasing the independence and powers of anti-corruption bodies. Instead, the experience of Singapore and Hong Kong shows the need for a sufficient level of political will and tough action to combat

corruption. In Ukraine, political will is limited by political power structures and pressure from business elites. This could lead to the failure of anti-corruption policy in Ukraine, similar to the experience of Indonesia, where the anti-corruption strategy provided for the legitimization of the political regime. In Ukraine, the decision of the WACS under the influence of business elites led to a move away from reforming the anti-corruption system. Exceeding the powers of the WACS compared to other anti-corruption bodies means moving away from democracy and the institution of the rule of law. In this case, accountability to the public by digitizing the work of anti-corruption bodies is not enough to combat corruption.

Development of information and analytical support is aimed at automating the processes of pre-trial investigations and criminal proceedings, information protection. As a tool for accountability, information and analytical systems may be ineffective due to the abuse of power by higher anti-corruption bodies due to political pressure from elite structures. Restrictions on political will are a major problem for the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Institutional inertia and the weakness of institutions due to the slow process of public administration reform are the main obstacles to combating corruption and building democracy.

References

- [1] Quah, J. S. (2008). Anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries: a comparative analysis. In *Comparative governance reform in Asia: Democracy, corruption, and government trust*. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. (Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 17), pp. 85-109. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0732-1317\(08\)17006-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0732-1317(08)17006-3)
- [2] Sampson, S. (2005). Integrity warriors: Global morality and the anti-corruption movement in the Balkans. *Corruption: anthropological perspectives*, 103-30.
- [3] Faull, A. (2007). Corruption and the South African police service. A review and its implications. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 2007(150), 20-20.
- [4] Heilbrunn, J. R., & Commissions, A. C. (2004). Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption. *World Bank Institute*.
- [5] Light, M. (2014). Police reforms in the Republic of Georgia: the convergence of domestic and foreign policy in an anti-corruption drive. *Policing and Society*, 24(3), 318-345. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2013.784289>
- [6] Fjeldstad, O. H., & Isaksen, J. (2008). Anti-corruption reforms: challenges, effects and limits of World Bank support. *IEG Working Paper*. Washington DC: Independent

- Evaluation Group (IEG), World Bank (IEG Working Paper no. 7) 78 p.
- [7] De Speville, B. (2010). Anticorruption commissions: the "Hong Kong model" revisited. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 17(1), 47-71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2010.482757>
 - [8] The official site of Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2020), "The costs of corruption during humanitarian crises, and mitigation strategies for development agencies", Available at: <https://www.u4.no/publications/the-costs-of-corruption-during-humanitarian-crises-and-mitigation-strategies-for-development-agencies>
 - [9] De Sousa, L. (2010). Anti-corruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance. *Crime, law and social change*, 53(1), 5-22. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9211-3>
 - [10] Schütte, S. A. (2012). Against the odds: Anti-corruption reform in Indonesia. *Public Administration and Development*, 32(1), 38-48. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.623>
 - [11] Meagher, P. (2005). Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality. *The Journal of Policy Reform*, 8(1), 69-103. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1384128042000328950>
 - [12] Zhu, J., Huang, H., & Zhang, D. (2019). "Big tigers, big data": Learning social reactions to China's anticorruption campaign through online feedback. *Public Administration Review*, 79(4), 500-513. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12866>
 - [13] Iatsyshyn, A. V., Kovach, V. O., Romanenko, Y. O., Deinega, I. I., Iatsyshyn, A. V., Popov, O. O., . . . Lytvynova, S. H. (2020). Application of augmented reality technologies for preparation of specialists of new technological era. Paper presented at the *CEUR Workshop Proceedings*, 2547, 181-200.
 - [14] Romanenko, Y. O., & Chaplay, I. V. (2016). Marketing communication system within public administration mechanisms. *Actual Problems of Economics*, 17(4), 69-78.
 - [15] Doig, A., & Riley, S. (1998). Corruption and anti-corruption strategies: Issues and case studies from developing countries. *Corruption and integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries*, 45, 62.
 - [16] Quah, J. S. (2010). Defying institutional failure: learning from the experiences of anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 53(1), 23-54. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9213-1>
 - [17] Gray, C. W., & Kaufman, D. (1998). Corruption and development. PREM Notes; No. 4. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11545>
 - [18] Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework. *Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice*, 20(3), 239-252. [https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-162X\(200008\)20:3%3C239::AID-PAD138%3E3.0.CO;2-3](https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-162X(200008)20:3%3C239::AID-PAD138%3E3.0.CO;2-3)
 - [19] Kuris, G. (2015). Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?. *Policy and Society*, 34(2), 125-135. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.003>
 - [20] Iqbal, M. S., & Seo, J. W. (2008). E-governance as an anti corruption tool: Korean cases, 11(2), 51-78.
 - [21] Praça, S., & Taylor, M. M. (2014). Inching toward accountability: The evolution of Brazil's anticorruption institutions, 1985–2010. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 56(2), 27-48. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00230.x>
 - [22] Transparency International (2020). Corruption Perception Index. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/ukr>
 - [23] National Agency on Corruption Prevention (2020). <https://nazk.gov.ua/en/>
 - [24] National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (2020a). <https://nabu.gov.ua>
 - [25] National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (2020b). https://nabu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/reports/zvit_ii_2020_s_ayt_f.pdf
 - [26] Transparency International (2015). The state of corruption: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Available at: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2015_StateOfCorruption_AMAZGEMDUA_EN.pdf
 - [27] Leak, T. A. (1999). The experience of Singapore in combating corruption. *Curbing Corruption*, 59-66.
 - [28] Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—systemic corruption as a collective action problem. *Governance*, 26(3), 449-471. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x>
 - [29] Butt, S. (2011). Anti-corruption reform in Indonesia: an obituary?. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 47(3), 381-394. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2011.619051>
 - [30] Sakovska O., Shpykuliak O., Ushkarenko Iu., Chmut A. (2018) Socio-economic institutions for development of cooperation. *Financial and credit activity: problems of theory and practice*. 4(27), 513-521. <https://doi.org/10.18371/fcaptp.v4i27.154368>.
 - [31] The official site of Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2020), "Anti-corruption in Covid-19 preparedness and response", available at: <https://www.u4.no/publications/anti-corruptionin-covid-19-preparedness-and-response.pdf> (Accessed 15.10.2020)