

Normative-Legal and Information Security of Socio-Political Processes in Ukraine: a Comparative Aspect

Valentyna Goshovska¹ Lydiia Danylenko² Ihor Chukhrai³ Nataliia Chukhrai⁴ Pavlo Kononenko⁵

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

Summary

The aim of the article is to investigate socio-political processes in Ukraine on the basis of institutional and behavioral approaches, in particular their regulatory and informational support. Methodology. To determine the nature and content of socio-political processes, the following approaches have been used: 1. Institutional approach in order to analyze the development of Ukraine's political institutions. 2. The behavioral approach has been used for the analysis of socio-political processes in Ukraine in the context of political behavior of citizens, their political activity which forms the political culture of the country. Results. The general features of the socio-political situation in Ukraine are as follows: the formed model of government, which can be conditionally described as "presidential"; public demand for new leaders remains at a high level; the society has no common vision of further development; significant tendency of reduction of real incomes of a significant part of the society and strengthening of fiscal pressure on businessmen will get a public response after some time. Increasing levels of voice, accountability, efficiency of governance and the quality of the regulatory environment indicate a slow change in the political system, which will have a positive impact on public sentiment in the future. At the same time, there has been little change in the quality of Ukraine's institutions to ensure political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption. There are no cardinal changes in the development of the institution of property rights, protection of intellectual rights, changes in the sphere of ethics and control of corruption. Thus, Ukraine's political institutions have not been able to bring about any change in the social-political processes. Accordingly, an average level of trust and confidence of citizens in political institutions and negative public sentiment regarding their perception and future change can be traced in Ukraine.

Keywords:

socio-political processes; political institutions; political culture; societal attitudes; institutional approach.

1. Introduction

Socio-political processes have been changing since the beginning of the new government in Ukraine in 2019, particularly due to the development of the legal and regulatory framework. The political process is a set of different activities of political actors included in the dynamics of practically political relations, covering all stages of the functioning of the political system and aimed at achieving a political goal. The prerequisite of the social

base of the political process is the social process. The societal (social) process is the cumulative sequence of actions of social communities, strata, groups and individuals, aimed at reproducing and ensuring the stable development of the social system. Reflecting the reality of society, the reality of social, economic, and spiritual life, the political process is an aggregate of the results of various varieties of political behaviour of social communities, social strata and citizens, and the activity of power bodies and structures. This also includes a reality in which different subcultures, mutually exclusive traditions and many factors interact, constantly introducing something new and non-standard into the course of events. The political process as a social phenomenon, revealing the content of politics through real forms, shows that some reproduce elements of the links of the political system, while others destroy, develop and create. Through this process, deep configurations of the political system take place, and the political system itself moves from one condition to another. The political process reveals the movement, the dynamics, the evolution of political life.

The aim of the article is to investigate socio-political processes in Ukraine on the basis of institutional and behavioral approaches, in particular their regulatory and informational support.

2. Literature review

Socio-political processes are usually examined from several perspectives - in terms of theory and methodology, in terms of empirics and applied methodologies (Nastych, 2003). All this makes it possible to identify patterns of dynamics and perspectives for the evolution of various processes and phenomena of social life. The effectiveness of planning and management depends on the level of scientific understanding of socio-political processes. Under present conditions "understanding of forms of joint life of heterogeneous (at different levels of development) social and geopolitical structures, ways of their sustainable coevolutionary development is a constructive alternative to the present day". (Lutsevych, 2013; D'anieri, Kravchuk & Kuzio, 2018).

There are various approaches to defining the nature and content of the political process. The method of research chosen determines the nature of process analysis: whether it is at the micro level, analyzing the specifics of individual political behavior, or at the level of a political institution or system to study political processes on a national scale (Vilkov, 2018).

The main approaches are institutional, behavioral, structural-functional, rational choice theory, discursive and some others (Laverty, 2008; Cleary, 2016; Stewart & Dollbaum, 2017; Liasota, 2018).

Institutionalists see the basis of the political process in the formation, functioning and development of political institutions. The main focus of the institutional approach is the study of the main subject of the political process - political institutions (Zheltovskyy, 2019).

Behaviorists view the political process as a process of individual and group behavior. They focus not on political institutions but on the mechanisms of exercising power. The subject of their analysis is political behavior at the individual and socially aggregated levels. Behaviorists cover numerous aspects of the political process related to political behavior, such as leadership, activities of political parties and interest groups, voting in elections, participation in other forms of political activity, including non-conventional ones (demonstrations, rallies) (Shapovalova & Burlyuk, 2018).

Representatives of the structural-functional approach consider the essence of the political process to be the process of functioning and interaction of the political system elements. Performing their functions and interacting with each other, they constitute its structure (Cleary, 2016; Stewart & Dollbaum, 2017). The proponents of structural-functional analysis, whose founder is T. Parsons, represent society as a system, which includes stable elements and the ways of connections between them, which together represent the structure of the system. Each of these elements performs a specific function that is important to maintain the system in its integrity. The main objective of research, according to representatives of this approach, is to identify the elements of the system, their functions and the ways of connection between them. This approach is mainly used to study political processes at the macro level (Laverty, 2008; Cleary, 2016).

Optimal choice theory studies the individual as an independent, active political actor (actor) on the basis of the nature of his or her orientations, choice of rational behavior and other traits. This theory proceeds from the secondary character of politics in relation to the individual and from the rationalization of the individual's actions according to maximum benefit. The aim of the analysis is to find such conditions of the political game in which its participants choose some strategies of behavior that are beneficial to both them and others. (Stewart & Dollbaum, 2017; Liasota, 2018). This approach is used to analyze parliamentary

activity and coalition building, voter behavior, international relations and is used extensively in modeling political action.

3. Methodology

The study uses a comprehensive approach to the analysis of socio-political processes in Ukraine and their regulatory and informational support. To determine the nature and content of socio-political processes, the following was used:

1. Institutional approach to analyze the development of Ukraine's political institutions. Within the framework of this approach, a statistical analysis of the dynamics of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) subindexes containing data on aggregate and individual governance indicators of Ukraine over the period 1996-2020 was conducted. Based on the WGI, the dynamics of six governance dimensions were assessed: 1. Voice and Accountability. 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. 3. Government Effectiveness. 4. Regulatory Quality. 5. Rule of Law. 6. Control of Corruption.

The aggregated governance indicators are calculated based on a survey of businesses, citizens and experts in Ukraine on the development of political institutions. The indexes also take into account more than 30 individual data sources created by various research institutes, think tanks, NGOs, international organizations and private sector firms (World Bank, 2022a).

The Competitiveness Index is also used to examine Ukraine's political institutions and the development of the legal and regulatory framework. The Index contains World Bank (2022b) assessments of the development of public institutions: 1) property law and protection of intellectual rights, ethics and corruption, undue influence, public sector efficiency, and security.

2. A behavioral approach was used to analyze socio-political processes in Ukraine in the context of political behavior of citizens, their political activity that forms the political culture of the country. In particular, within the framework of this approach the analysis of political behavior at individual and socio-aggregated levels, leadership, activities of political parties and interest groups, voting in elections, participation in other forms of political activity was conducted. The results of the World Values Survey for Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020 were used to analyze political behavior and culture. In particular, a statistical analysis of such components of socio-political processes in the framework of this approach was conducted: 1) interest in politics, attitudes towards certain provisions on equality, property, government responsibility, competition, work, wealth accumulation in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020;

2) levels of confidence and trust in Ukrainian organizations in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020, in particular political institutions;

3) subjective assessment of the political system in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020.

Secondary data from Razumkov Center surveys conducted in July-August 2021 and November 11-17, 2021 (Razumkov Center, 2021a) have also been used to assess public trust in politicians and e-orientations of Ukrainians. The information and analytical materials of the Razumkov Center have also been used to assess the type of political culture in Ukraine.

4. Results

4.1 General assessment of the socio-political situation in Ukraine

The processes of European integration, decentralisation, democratisation and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises are actively taking place in Ukraine, which demonstrates the dynamics of socio-political processes. At the present stage Ukraine can be classified as a country with secondary modernisation owing to the processes of European integration. It promotes borrowing of EU experience in public administration, functioning of political institutions, implementation of decentralization reforms in various spheres of life and other important reforms according to the leading experience of European countries. The main thesis of the modernisation theory lies in the fact that socio-economic development leads to natural and to a certain extent predictable changes in cultural and political life. Modernisation entails cultural changes, which result in the formation and flourishing of democratic institutions. In the post-industrial phase of modernisation, the society is increasingly demanding democracy - a form of government that ensures the widest possible freedom to choose one's own life path (Pivovarova & Khliapatura, 2015).

The common features of Ukraine's socio-political situation are as follows. Ukraine as a whole has developed a model of government that can be conditionally described as presidential or even hyper-presidential with formal preservation of the parliamentary-presidential form of government as defined by the Constitution. President V. Zelenskyy and his entourage, concentrated both in the structure of the Office of the President of Ukraine and in the Verkhovna Rada leadership, have a virtually monopoly influence on the legislative and executive branches of power. This creates opportunities for relatively unproblematic decision-making in which the President is interested and which could be aimed at the implementation of the key theses of his election programme.

A large part of society expresses dissatisfaction with the course of the situation in the country and the state of

implementation by the authorities of their electoral promises. Nevertheless, President V. Zelenskyy remains the leader with the greatest public support. At the same time, the level of this support, as well as the level of public trust in the President, has a steady upward trend, especially in connection with the events of 2022.

President Zelenskyy and the "Sluha Narodu" party are no longer perceived as new political leaders. Meanwhile, public demand for new leaders remains high. As of the end of 2021, none of the leading politicians and parliamentary political forces could compete with Zelenskyy and his "Sluha Narodu". They failed to offer the society their agendas and vision of the model of further development of the country.

The society does not have a unified vision of the future development outlook. Both the majority of the public and a large part of the expert community demonstrate rather negative expectations of the country's development in the short term. This contrasts sharply with the picture of public expectations two years ago. The political regime in Ukraine is traditionally influenced by the way the President performs his constitutional duties. Thus, the reference points of each regime or its modifications become each successive presidential election. The results of elections of national deputies, the date of which often does not coincide with the date of presidential elections, for the most part act as a confirmation of the thesis that the nature of the regime has changed in line with the change in the personality of the President. Previously, every political regime in Ukraine had been formed on the basis of the will of the people during elections, which were generally recognised as democratic. The regime embodied by President Zelenskyy was no exception, its source being the results of the presidential and early parliamentary elections of 2019. Consequently, this regime is formally of democratic origin. It is characterized by a certain level of sustainability, which demonstrates the lack of obvious consequences for V. Zelenskyy and his inner circle at this stage as a result of many ill-conceived political decisions. They have led to the low efficiency of state policy on counteracting coronavirus disease and organizing vaccination of the population. These decisions also include numerous scandals involving both the President and his entourage and members of the political force oriented towards him, and a decline in the level of the country's international subjectivity.

The noticeable downward trend in the real incomes of a large part of society and the increasing fiscal pressure on entrepreneurs will resonate with the public in a while. This has its explanations. Firstly, V. Zelenskyy and the party "Sluha Narodu" focused on him won the next presidential and early parliamentary elections of 2019, respectively, with phenomenal result for Ukraine. Since the restoration of independence, he received so far the greatest credit of trust of voters. Society, under constant stress since the Revolution of Dignity and the start of Russian aggression

against Ukraine, has made an expressive demand for a new quality of politics and new political practices that could bring new faces. Such credibility cannot disappear in the short term, yet the process is ongoing and its consequences could have a negative impact on the state's stability. The public does not yet see a worthy alternative among other leaders and political forces. Second, Zelenskyy and the "Sluha Narodu" party benefited from the commitment of a significant proportion of key actors and stakeholders in the socio-political and socio-economic processes in Ukraine even during the 2019 campaign.

As of late 2019, the government's relations with these different stakeholder groups were no longer unclouded, but the different conflict lines were mostly potential, and only some national TV channels (owned by "oligarchs") started providing platforms to those who criticized the incumbent authorities. Thirdly, the public perception of the so-called "old" leaders and political forces has significantly decreased in recent years. At the same time, during half of Zelenskyy's term of office, only a few of them continued to be active politically. None of them [the "old" political forces] were able to offer the public an alternative to the policies of the incumbent authorities - their agenda. For the most part, each of them was concerned about preserving their "core" electorate and relied on mistakes by the authorities to help them regain previous public support. Such a position was rather misguided. In addition, V. Zelenskyy has demonstrated an ability to mimic his previously declared position (in particular regarding his assessment of the conflict with Russia and the ways to achieve peace) to a certain extent in line with the sentiments currently prevailing in society.

In general, during the period from the change of the ruling elites and the formation of a new government based on the results of the 2019 elections to the end of 2021, the state continued the tendency to level the role and importance of the traditional institutions of a democratic state (in particular, the Parliament), to destroy the system of checks and balances characteristic of the previous regime, where it was obvious that a balance between the positions of different actors had to be found. At the same time, certain constraints are still present in the current political regime, but they are mostly extra-parliamentary in nature - such as public sentiment, the position of local elites, etc. One of the most prominent features of the current political regime is its almost complete focus on personal leadership (in this case of V. Zelenskyy) at the expense of institutional development. This meets public expectations to a certain extent. Personal leadership, together with a tendency to adjust to public sentiment, contains the threat of losing control of the situation as a result of populist decisions.

4.2. Analysis of the development of Ukraine's political institutions

The Ukraine Governance Index reflects the public's assessment of the traditions and political institutions on which governance is founded in the country (Table 2.11). Governance includes the processes of government choice, forms of control and change; and the government's ability to effectively shape and implement sound policies. Assessment of governance also indicates citizens' and the state's respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions between them.

Table 1: Dynamics of the Ukraine Governance Index 1996-2020

Sub-Index	1996		2000		2010		2020	
	Assessment	Percentile Rank	Assessment	Percentile Rank	Assessment	Percentile Rank	Assessment	Percentile Rank
Voice and Accountability	-0,32	39,50	-0,61	30,85	-0,08	45,02	0,09	51,69
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	-0,15	42,55	-0,41	32,28	0,01	45,50	-1,16	12,26
Government Effectiveness	-0,67	27,87	-0,70	26,15	-0,78	24,40	-0,36	38,94
Regulatory Quality	-0,42	33,70	-0,53	29,23	-0,52	33,97	-0,30	40,87
Rule of Law	-0,82	22,61	-1,11	14,36	-0,81	25,12	-0,67	27,40
Control of Corruption	-1,11	13,44	-1,15	8,63	-1,03	16,19	-0,78	23,56

Source: World Bank (2022a).

The next indicator to assess the institutional determinants of value priorities in the Ukrainian economy is the World Bank Competitiveness Index (2022b), which evaluates the development of institutions: 1) public, namely property

rights and protection of intellectual property rights, ethics and corruption, undue influence, public sector efficiency, security; 2) private, namely corporate ethics, accountability (Table 2).

Table 2. Ukraine’s Global Competitiveness Index: Subindex of Public Institution Development, 2007-2018

Index	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018
Global Competitiveness Index	3,98	4,09	3,95	3,90	4,00	4,14	4,05	4,14	4,03	4,00	4,11
Institutions	3,12	3,26	3,10	2,96	2,98	3,13	2,99	2,98	3,07	3,05	3,21
Public Institutions	3,07	3,09	3,20	2,99	2,84	2,87	3,03	2,84	2,76	2,84	2,84
1. Property Rights	3,32	3,29	3,27	2,85	2,60	2,67	2,73	2,51	2,70	2,95	2,95
2. Ethics and Corruption	2,62	2,50	2,50	2,26	2,28	2,32	2,42	2,45	2,58	2,77	2,77
3. Undue Influence	2,53	2,58	2,64	2,36	2,16	2,36	2,50	2,23	2,26	2,48	2,48
4. Government Effectiveness	2,75	2,77	3,00	2,67	2,59	2,63	2,68	2,49	2,68	2,87	2,87
5. Security	4,12	4,30	4,58	4,81	4,55	4,37	4,84	4,52	3,61	3,15	3,15

Source: World Economic forum (2022).

4.3. Analysis of Ukraine’s socio-political processes in the context of citizens’ political behavior and political activities Table 3 presents the results of assessments of interest in politics, attitudes towards selected provisions on equality, property, government responsibility, competition, work, accumulation of wealth in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020. The level of citizens’ involvement in politics has not decreased significantly: the average score is 2.72 (the answer is “not much”). Respondents believe that it is necessary to increase the income difference to motivate to apply more effort in work (average 5,82), to increase the

share of private property (average 6,37 with increase 0,31), to increase responsibility of the government for provision of citizens (average 3,72 with increase 0,99). Citizens believe that competition stimulates work and development, new ideas (average 4.24 with a 0.36 increase). Respondents on average believe that both work is rewarding and connections for success and social capital are important (average 4.96 with a decrease of 0.08). Respondents on average assert the possibility of growth of well-being in all (average 6.3).

Table 3. Results of assessments of policy interest, attitudes towards selected provisions on equality, property, government responsibility, competition, work, wealth accumulation in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020

	1996	2006	2011	2020	The mean value, +/-	Deviation (2020-1996), +/-
Interest in politics (1 - very interested, 2 - rather interested, 3 - not very interested, 4 - not interested at all)	2,72	2,50	2,80	2,84	2,72	0,11
Assessment of statements: 1 - completely agree with the opinion, 10 - completely disagree and think the opposite						
Income equality (1 - reduce income inequality, 10 - increase income disparity)	6,67	6,94	3,51	6,16	5,82	-0,51
Private or public ownership (1 - increase private ownership, 10 - increase public ownership)	5,86	6,78	6,66	6,17	6,37	0,31
Government responsibility (1 - increase, 10 - sole responsibility of people)	3,45	3,96	3,01	4,44	3,72	0,99
Attitudes towards competition (1 - competition encourages people to work, 10 - competition is harmful)	3,78	4,58	4,44	4,14	4,24	0,36
Work is rewarded (1 - yes, 10 - connections, not work, ensure success)	5,15	4,92	4,71	5,07	4,96	-0,08
Wealth accumulation (1 - people get rich at the expense of others, 10 - levels of wealth can increase for all)	7,12	6,32	5,45	-	6,30	-

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of WVS Wave 3 (1995-1998); WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009); WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014); WVS Wave 7 (2017-2020).

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of respondents' answers to the questions on equality, property, government responsibility, competition, work, and wealth accumulation in Ukraine in 2020.




Fig. 1. Distribution of respondents' answers to questions on equality, ownership, government responsibility, competition, work, wealth accumulation in Ukraine in 2020

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of WVS Wave 3 (1995-1998); WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009); WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014); WVS Wave 7 (2017-2020).

Table 4 shows an assessment of confidence and trust in institutions in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020. The level of trust and confidence in the different organizations and institutions remained virtually unchanged over the

study period, with an average confidence value of 2.67 for all institutions (low level, tending towards the response "absolutely no trust").

Table 4. Assessment of confidence and trust in organizations in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020

	1996	2006	2011	2020	The mean value, +/-	Deviation (2020-1996), +/-
Level of trust in organizations (fully trusted - 1, somewhat trusted - 2, not very trusted - 3, not at all trusted - 4)						
Trust: Churches	2,15	2,13	2,00	2,11	2,10	-0,04
Trust: The armed forces	2,21	2,44	2,39	2,10	2,28	-0,11
Trust: The justice system / Courts	2,66	2,88	3,05	3,15	2,93	0,49
Trust: Press	2,67	2,59	2,55	2,92	2,68	0,26
Trust: Television	2,59	2,52	2,49	2,90	2,62	0,31
Trust: Trade unions	2,80	2,74	2,77	3,02	2,83	0,23
Trust: Police	2,83	2,87	2,94	2,81	2,86	-0,02
Trust: Government	2,71	2,96	3,07	3,16	2,97	0,45
Trust: Political parties	3,15	3,17	3,12	3,23	3,17	0,07
Trust: Parliament	2,82	3,11	3,13	3,24	3,07	0,42
Trust: State services	2,68	2,66	2,69	2,84	2,72	0,16

Trust: Major companies	2,47	2,57	2,73	2,72	2,62	0,25
Trust: Environmental protection movement	2,30	2,57	2,50	2,70	2,52	0,41
Trust: Women's movement	2,36	2,60	2,51	2,63	2,53	0,26
Trust: European Union	2,36	2,65	-	2,59	2,54	0,23
Trust: United Nations	2,26	2,71	2,59	2,47	2,51	0,21
Trust: Charities or humanitarian organizations	-	2,53	2,47	2,49	2,50	-

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of WVS Wave 3 (1995-1998); WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009); WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014); WVS Wave 7 (2017-2020).

The highest level of citizens' trust is in the European Union (2,54), Women's Movement (2,53), Environmental Movements (2,52), United Nations (2,51), Charities or Humanitarian Organizations (2,50), Armed Forces (2,28), Church (2,10). Political parties (3,17), Parliament (3,07), Government (2,97), Justice System/Courts (2,93), Police (2,86), Trade Unions (2,83), Public Services (2,72) are least trusted.

Survey of Trust in Politicians and Election Orientations of Ukrainians from November 11 to 17, 2021 indicates that respondents express distrust more often than trust in all politicians (Razumkov Center, 2021a). Survey of Trust in Public Institutions and Politicians, Electoral Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens (July-August 2021) reveals the following features of trust (Razumkov Center, 2021b):

1. Among the state and public institutions trust is most often expressed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (68% of respondents trust them), volunteer organizations (64%), the Church (63.5%), the State Emergency Service (61%), Head of the city (town, village) where a respondent resides (57%), State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (55%), National Guard of Ukraine (54%), volunteer battalions (53.5%), council of the city (town, village) where a respondent resides (51%).

2. Most often people do not trust Russian media (79% of respondents do not trust them), state bodies (officials)

(76%), Verkhovna Rada (75%), courts (the judicial system as a whole) (74%), the Government of Ukraine (72%), political parties (72%), prosecution offices (71%), commercial banks (71%), National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) (70%) and National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (70%), The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (69%), the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court (68%), the State Tax Service of Ukraine (65%), the State Customs Service of Ukraine (65%), local courts (65%), the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (63%), Supreme Court of Ukraine (63%), the National Bank of Ukraine (60%), the President of Ukraine (58%), trade unions (55%), the National Police (53%), the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (51%) and the Security Service of Ukraine (50%).

Table 5 outlines citizens' perceptions of the political system in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020. There is little change in the perception of the political system in Ukraine. The presence of a strong leader, independent of elections and Parliament, is perceived by citizens as a good governance system for the country (mean 2.21). Decision-making by experts rather than the government is perceived as "rather bad" managerial decision-making (2.43).

Table 5. Assessment of the political system in Ukraine in 1996, 2006, 2011 and 2020

	1996	2006	2011	2020	The mean value, +/-	Deviation (2020-1996), +/-
Assessment of political systems (1 - very good, 2 - rather good, 3 - rather bad, 4 - very bad)						
A strong leader, independent of parliament and elections	2,36	2,21	2,08	2,20	2,21	-0,16
It is not the government, but the experts who make the decisions they think are best for the country	2,37	2,43	2,30	2,61	2,43	0,24
Ruled by the military or a military regime	3,34	3,18	3,31	3,20	3,26	-0,14
A democratic political system	2,06	1,87	1,85	1,90	1,92	-0,16

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of WVS Wave 3 (1995-1998); WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009); WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014); WVS Wave 7 (2017-2020).

“Rather bad” citizens consider the ruling military regime for Ukraine (average 3.26). The democratic political system in Ukraine is increasingly perceived as an effective system of governing the country. The aforementioned perceptions and assessments indicate the presence of worldview prerequisites for European integration and democratization in Ukraine.

The assessment of political behavior and citizens' interest in politics allows the formation of the main characteristics of Ukraine's political culture:

1. Low level of inclination for interest in politics and participation in political life, only 38% of respondents noted that they are very interested in politics, 60% - are not at all interested or have little interest in political life of the country, which correlates with the results of World Values Survey in Ukraine. At the same time the majority state that one should be interested in politics (72%).

2. 55% of respondents are aware that Ukraine has a parliamentary-presidential form of government (21% are not aware, 8% give wrong answers); 56% of citizens do not know which articles of the Constitution were renewed at the beginning of 2014. At the same time, the majority of respondents are aware of the constitutional obligations.

3. In assessing the awareness of the government institutions functions, it was revealed that half of the respondents (51%) do not have information about the functions of the CMU, in particular in the management of budgetary funds. Low assessments of citizens' knowledge of the political system, which is provided in general education schools, were also revealed.

4. When assessing attitudes towards institutions, it was revealed that no institution was mentioned by most respondents as representing the interests of citizens in

public processes (among the answers, political parties, NGOs, trade unions, individual politicians, media, business structures). The level of trust in trade unions is not very high. 46% of citizens do not see political leaders in Ukraine who could effectively govern the country and 49% do not see such political parties and movements that can be trusted. The level of trust in institutions representing citizens' interests such as the Verkhovna Rada, political parties, and individual politicians is extremely low and scored 2 on a scale of 0-10, a score common to all regions and community groups. 35% of citizens chose the proportional system with open lists as the type of electoral system. 68% of those surveyed perceive vote-buying negatively. Since December 2009, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of citizens who believe democracy is the best type of government (47% in 2017). At the same time, the level of satisfaction with democracy in Ukraine is mediocre (score of 4 on a scale of 0-10). Citizens highly appreciate freedom of expression of political views (60%).

5. 75% of those interviewed recognise the division of economics and politics into spheres of influence between different interest groups, considering this a negative phenomenon.

The current situation in Ukraine is characterized by the prevalence of political culture types, which are characterized by distrust of politics and political institutions (61%). As can be seen from Table 6, there are some countries which are close to Ukraine in terms of the values of the indicators of political culture, for example, the share of bearers of civic culture in Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Table 6. Distribution of political culture types in Europe (by T.D. Denk and H. Christensen)

Country	Civic culture	Hidden culture	Critical culture	Disenchanted culture
Belgium	26,2	33,7	23,8	16,4
Bulgaria	4,5	5,3	47,1	43,2
Great Britain	26,6	21,8	33,5	18,1
Greece	11,5	28,0	21,4	39,1
Denmark	69,2	20,0	8,8	1,9
Estonia	19,6	24,8	29,3	26,3
Ireland	20,6	18,7	37,1	23,6
Spain	19,2	48,1	13,8	18,9
Cyprus	44,1	35,1	12,3	8,5
Latvia	3,2	14,1	35,0	47,7
The Netherlands	53,0	25,9	16,8	4,2
Germany	33,5	21,3	31,2	13,9
Norway	43,9	38,1	11,2	6,9
Poland	13,4	22,5	33,9	30,3
Portugal	9,3	27,5	23,1	40,1
Romania	17,3	20,1	30,2	32,4
Slovakia	21,2	30,6	25,9	22,3
Slovenia	21,5	26,8	32,5	19,2
Hungary	5,9	12,9	35,0	46,2
Finland	42,6	38,5	11,6	7,3
France	21,2	25,7	32,4	20,7
Croatia	9,0	20,5	25,7	44,8
Czech Republic	9,0	40,9	12,6	37,5
Switzerland	54,3	29,5	11,9	4,4
Sweden	49,2	29,1	14,9	6,8

Source: (Razumkov Center, 2021c).

5. Discussion

The processes of European integration, decentralization, democratization and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises are actively proceeding in Ukraine, which demonstrates the dynamics of socio-political processes. At the present stage, Ukraine can be classified as a country with secondary modernisation owing to the processes of European integration. It promotes borrowing of the EU experience in public administration, functioning of political institutions, implementation of decentralization reforms in various spheres of life and other important reforms according to the leading experience of European countries.

Over the period 2019-2021, there have been continuing trends towards the levelling of the role and importance of the traditional institutions of a democratic state and the destruction of checks and balances in the state. Constraining factors in the current political regime are public sentiments, in particular mistrust of the political system due to long-standing processes of corruption and bureaucracy. These sentiments are largely extra-parliamentary in nature. One of the most essential features of the current political regime is its almost complete focus on personal leadership at the expense of institutional development. This is, to a certain extent, in line with public expectations. Personal leadership, together with a tendency to adjust to public sentiment, contains the threat of losing control of the situation through populist decisions.

Assessment of development indicators of public institutions and traditions characteristic for public administration in Ukraine indicates growth of voice, accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality. At the same time, relatively stable for the Ukrainian public administration, socio-political processes are the institutions to ensure political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption. The competitiveness index assesses the development of public institutions. It indicates absence of cardinal changes in development of the institution of property right, protection of intellectual rights, absence of changes in the sphere of ethics and control of corruption, significant illegal influence on the activity of economic agents. The study also identified a lack of trust in the political institutions of citizens and businesses. The effectiveness of the public sector remains at an average level. Consequently, over the period 1996-2020 in Ukraine, the level of trust and confidence of citizens in institutions remained virtually unchanged, and the mean value of confidence in all institutions was 2.67. Weak trust in public-private institutions, in particular political institutions, due to a long-term lack of protection of citizens' interests, has a negative impact on stimulating economic activity and entrepreneurship. Trust is one of the factors whose change will determine Ukraine's future socio-political processes. In addition, Ukraine is characterized by a lack of change in the

perception of the political system, the perception of democracy as an effective system of state governance.

6. Conclusion

The general features of the socio-political situation in Ukraine are defined as follows. There is an established model of government that can be tentatively described as "presidential". Public demand for new leaders remains at a high level. Society does not have a unified vision of the prospect of further development. A noticeable tendency towards reduction of real incomes of a significant part of society and strengthening of fiscal pressure on entrepreneurs will resonate with the public in a short while. Rising levels of voice, accountability, government effectiveness, and the regulatory quality indicate a slow change in the political system, which will positively influence public sentiment in the future. At the same time, the quality of institutions to ensure political stability, the rule of law and control of corruption has remained relatively unchanged in Ukraine. There are no fundamental changes in the development of the institution of property rights, protection of intellectual rights, changes in ethics and control of corruption. Thus, Ukraine's political institutions do not provide for changes in social and political processes. Accordingly, an average level of trust and confidence of citizens in political institutions and negative public sentiment regarding their perception and future change can be traced in Ukraine.

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¹**Valentyna Goshovska.** Recipient of a scientific degree Professor of the Department of Parliamentarism, Doctor of Political Sciences.

People's Deputy of Ukraine of several convocations, Honored Worker of Public Education of Ukraine, President of the public organization "Academy of Parliamentarism", head of the Scientific School of National Parliamentarism. Experience in management positions.

Research interests: domestic parliamentarism, elite studies, parliamentary activities, social policy, training of public servants, social protection, modern management technologies in public administration and administration, parliament, People's Representation.

²**Lydiia Danylenko.** Recipient of a scientific degree Professor of the Department of Parliamentarism., Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences.

Experience in management positions in research institutions, higher education institutions, public authorities

Research interests: management of educational innovations, training of managers of the education system and public servants, domestic, parliamentarism, information provision of public administration, innovations in social and political processes.

³**Thor Chukhrai.** Recipient of a scientific degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science of the Educational and Scientific Institute of public administration and public service of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University. (Department of Parliamentarism).

Research interests: public policy, legal nihilism, social and political processes, political and legal support for overcoming legal nihilism.

⁴**Nataliia Chukhrai.** Recipient of a scientific degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science of the Educational and Scientific Institute of public administration and public service of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University. (Department of Parliamentarism).

Research interests: public policy, political conflicts, crises, legal and information support for the settlement of socio-political conflicts and crises.

⁵**Pavlo Kononenko.** Recipient of a scientific degree Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration of the Educational and Scientific Institute of public administration and public service of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University (Department of Parliamentarism)

Research interests: parliament, public administration, electoral process, culture of electoral democracy, development of parliamentarism, information support for the development of the culture of electoral democracy.