

Anew ID-based Multi-Proxy Signature

Nguyen Duc Toan

Hanoi University of Natural Resources and Environment, Vietnam

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new ID-based multi proxy signature is a solution of delegation of signing capabilities. Proxy signatures can combine other special signatures to obtain some new types of proxy signatures.

Keywords:

Signature, multisignature, ID-Based

1. Introduction

The concept of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996 [9]. In the proxy signature scheme, an original signer is allowed to authorize a designated person as his proxy signer. Then the proxy signer is able to sign on behalf of the original signer. Since then, many proxy signature schemes have been proposed [7,8,10]. Proxy signatures can combine other special signatures to obtain some new types of proxy signatures. Till now, there are various kinds of proxy signature schemes have been proposed [1,2,5,6,13–15]. The multi-proxy signature scheme was first proposed in 2000 [6]. In a multi-proxy signature scheme, an original signer could authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. Then only the cooperation of all the signers in the proxy group can generate the proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer. It can be regarded as a special case of a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme for $t = n$. A contrary concept, proxy multi-signature was also introduced by Yi et al. in 2000 [14]. Another kind of proxy signature schemes is multi-proxy multisignature schemes proposed by Hwang [5]. In multi-proxy multi-signature schemes, an original group of signers can authorize a group of proxy signers under the agreement of all signers both in the original group and the proxy group. Then only the cooperation of all signers in proxy group can generate multi-proxy multi-signatures. multi-proxy multi-signatures can play important roles in the following scenario: For a large building, there are some conflict

among the constructors and the householders. All householders of the large building want to authorize a lawyer group as their agents. So a group of lawyers are authorized to act on behalf of all householders. The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we will give some preliminary works. Section 3 recalls the general identity based signature schemes. We will present our identity based multi-proxy signature scheme in Section 4 and provide its security analysis in Section 5. ID-based proxy multi-signature scheme and its security analysis are presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.

2. Preliminaries

In this section, we will first describe the basic definition and properties of the bilinear pairings. Let G_1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q , and G_2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q . Let a, b be elements of \mathbb{Z}^*_q . We assume that the discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in both G_1 and G_2 are hard. A bilinear pairings is a map $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ with the following properties:

- (1) Bilinear: $\hat{e}(aP, bQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{ab}$
- (2) Non-degenerate: There exists P and $Q \in G_1$ such that $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq 1$;
- (3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$ for all $P, Q \in G_1$

In the proxy signature scheme, an original signer is allowed to authorize a designated person as his proxy signer. Then the proxy signer is able to sign on behalf of the original signer. Basically, a secure proxy

signature scheme should satisfy the following requirements [8].

Strong unforgeability: Only the legitimate proxy signer can generate a valid proxy signature; even the original signer cannot.

Verifiability: Anyone can verify the signature and the signed message should conform to the delegation warrant.

Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer.
Strong undeniability: The proxy signer cannot repudiate the signature which he ever generates.

Prevention of misuse: The proxy key pair should be used in any place conforms to the warrant. Like the general proxy signature, an identity based proxy signature scheme should provide the properties as above.

3. General ID-based signature schemes

In 1984 Shamir introduced identity based cryptosystems [12] in which the user's public key can be generated from a publicly identifiable information such as his email address. For such a system to work there are Trusted Authorities (or Private Key Generators) that generate users' private key from their identity information. Many identity based signature schemes have been devised since 1984 [1,3,4,11,15]. Generally, an identity based signature scheme consists of four algorithms which are the following.

Setup: The PKG picks a security parameter k and generates the system's public parameters and the master-key.

Extraction: This algorithm is performed by the PKG when a user requests a secret key corresponding to his identity. The secret key is given to the user in a secure way. This step is done only once for every identity and uses the same Setup data for many different identities.

Signing: User Alice with identity IDA and secret key $dIDA$ uses this algorithm with input (m, IDA) to produce a signature σ on m valid under the public key derived from IDA .

Verification: On input of (m, IDA, σ) this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is not $ID A$'s signature on m and it outputs 0 otherwise.

4. Identity based multi-proxy signature scheme

In this section, we propose an identity based multi-proxy signature scheme. Some initial settings of the scheme are assumed in identity based systems. Our multi-proxy signature scheme with the clerk architecture is divided into five phases: System setup phase, Extraction phase, Proxy key generation phase, Multi-proxy signature generation phase, and Verification phase.

[System setup phase] Given a security parameter k , the PKG chooses groups G_1 and G_2 of prime order q , a generator P of G_1 , a bilinear map $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ and hash functions $H_1: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$, $H_2: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^*_q$, $H_3: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^*_q$. It chooses a masterkey $s \in \mathbb{Z}^*_q$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP \in G_1$.

The PKG publishes system's $Params = \{k, G_1, G_2, q, \hat{e}, H_1, H_2, H_3, P, P_{pub}\}$ and keeps the master-key s secret.

[Extraction phase]

Given an identity ID , the PKG computes his public key QID and secret key $dIDA$ as follows:
 $QID = H_2(ID) \in G_1$
 $dIDA = sQID = IDBi \in G_1$.
 Thus, the original signer Alice has the public key $QIDA$ and private key $dIDA$.
 The proxy signers PSi with identity $IDPSi$ have public keys $QIDSPi$ and corresponding private keys $dIDPS$. Without loss of generality, assume that there are n proxy signers in the proxy group.

[Proxy key generation phase]

To delegate the signing capability to a group of proxy signers, the original signer Alice does the following to make the signed warrant mw . The warrant mw specifies the delegation period, what kind of messages is delegated, the identity information of the original signer and the proxy group member, etc. If the following process is finished successfully, each proxy signer PSi gets a proxy key dPi .

- Alice chooses $x \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ computes $U = xP$; $H = H2(m)d$

$ap = H1(mw \| U) dIDBi + xP_{pub}$ sends (mw, U, dap) to the proxy group.

- Each proxy signer PSi in the proxy group accepts dap as a valid key only if the following equation is satisfied:

$$\hat{e}(P, dap) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi) H1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub})$$

Then, he computes the proxy key pairs as:

$$dBi = dap + H1(mw \| U) dIDBi$$

$$QBi = H1(mw \| U) (QIDA + QBsi) + U$$

Using $\{dPi\}$ these proxy signers can cooperate to sign any message which conforms to mw on behalf of the original signer Alice.

[Multi-proxy signature generation phase]

To generate a multi-proxy signature on a message m that conforms to the warrant mw one proxy signer in the proxy group is designated as a clerk, whose task is to combine partial proxy signatures to generate the final multi-proxy signature.

- Each proxy signer PSi , for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$

chooses : $xi \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$

Computes: $h3 = H3(m, w)$ and $Ui = xiP$

broadcasts his Ui to the other $n - 1$ proxy signers

- Each proxy signer PSi , for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ computes:

$$Up = \sum_{i=1}^n Upi$$

$$Spi = h3Spki + xi P_{pub}$$

Sends (Up, Spi) to the clerk as his partial proxy signature on the message m .

The clerk verifies the partial proxy signatures by the equation

$$\hat{e}(P, Spi) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, h'Qpki + Upi)$$

Once all partial proxy signatures are correct, the multi-proxy signature of message m can be generated as (Up, Sp, m, U) by computing

[Verification phase]

After receiving the multi-proxy signature (Up, Sp, m, U) and the message m , the verifier operates as follows.

(1) Check whether or not the message m conforms to the warrant mw . If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.

(2) Check whether or not the n proxy signers are authorized by the original signer Alice in the warrant mw . If not, stop. Otherwise, continue.

(3) Recover the proxy public key QPi , for $i = 1, \dots, n$:

$$dBi = dap + H1(mw \| U) dIDBi$$

$$QBi = H1(mw \| U) (QIDA + QBsi) + U$$

(4) Accept the multi-proxy signature if and only if the following equality holds:

$$\hat{e}(P, dap) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi) H1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub});$$

$$c = H1(m \| r); r = \hat{e}(P, P)x; S = xP - cdp$$

5. Analysis of the proposed scheme

5.1. Correctness

The property of correctness is satisfied. In effect, if the multi-proxy signature is correctly generated, then:

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi + \sum_{i=1}^n QIDBi) cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub}) c \\ r &= \hat{e}(P, P)x \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S + cdp) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P, dp) c \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P, H1(mw \| U) dIDBi + \sum_{i=1}^n dapini) c \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi) cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^n H1(mw \| U) ni) dIDBi \\ &\quad + xiP_{pub} c \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi) cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^n dIDBi ini) + \\ &\quad xiP_{pub} cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^n xini) P_{pub} c \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi) cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, \sum_{i=1}^n QIDBi ini) cH1(mw \| U) \\ &\quad \hat{e}(U, P_{pub}) c \\ &= \hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi + \sum_{i=1}^n QIDBi) cH1(mw \| U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub}) c \end{aligned}$$

5.2. Security

In this section, we will show that the multi-proxy signature scheme satisfies all the requirements stated in Section 2.

Unforgeability: As for multi-proxy signature, there are mainly three kinds of attackers: outsiders, who do not participate the issue of the multi-proxy signature; some proxsigner, who play an active in the signing process; and the signature owner. Firstly, since we use a modified Hess's scheme, which is proven secure, to generate the multi-proxy signature, any third party who can even get Alice's signature on the warrant mw cannot forge the multi-proxy signature. On the other hand, the original signer Alice cannot generate a valid multi-proxy signature since those proxy signers' private keys $\{dIDPSi\}$ are used in the multi-proxy signature generation algorithm. Secondly, even the clerk, who has more power than other proxy signers in the proxy group, cannot forge a multi-proxy signature. To see this, suppose that the clerk wants the proxy group to sign a false message m' . Of course, he can change his own Ui , therefore Up .

Then he tries to compute Sp . such that the equation: $\hat{e}(P, dap) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi)H1(mw\|U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub})$ holds.

But it is equivalent to solve the bilinear pairing inversion problem, which is defined as: given $P \in G1$ and $e(P, S) \in G2$, find $S \in G1$. Since the bilinear pairing inversion problem is reducible to computational Diffie–Hellman problem in $G2$. and can be reduced to DLP in $G2$ and CDHP and DLP are intractable in $G2$, the clerk cannot forge a valid multi-proxy signature by this way. Lastly, since the signature owner cannot obtain more information than the clerk, he cannot generate a valid multi-proxy signature. From the above discussion, we conclude that our scheme is unforgeable.

Verifiability: Because the warrant contains the identity information and the limit of the delegated signing capacity, the verifier can verify the signature and check whether the signed message conforms to the delegation warrant or not.

Identifiability: Since there is the warrant in a valid proxy signature, anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from mw .
Undeniability: The clerk owns other proxy signers' partial signature on message m , and validates them by checking whether or not the equation:

$$\hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi + \sum_{i=1}^n QIDBi) cH1(mw\|U) \hat{e}(U, P_{pub})^c$$

holds, so no one can deny his signature of earlier session.

Prevention of misuse: There is the warrant that has an explicit description of delegated signing capability, so the proxy signers can not sign any messages that has not been authorized by Alice.

6. Discussions on the multi-proxy multi-signature scheme

Our scheme is based on the multi-proxy signature scheme proposed in Section 4. The proxy certificate must be generated by the cooperation of the original group and the proxy group. Thus, the proxy certificate is verified by the equation

$$\hat{e}(P, S) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, QIDBi + \sum_{i=1}^n QIDBi) cH1(mw\|U)$$

Which uses the public keys of all original signers and all proxy signers. The original group is not able to arbitrarily announce that some group is its proxy agent without the agreement of the proxy group. Therefore, the scheme provides the protection for the proxy group. On the other hand, the proxy group cannot deny they are the proxy agent, since they had agreed the proxy authorization. Therefore, the original signers' rights are also protected. No one can create the multi-proxy multi-signature without the authorization of the original group. Moreover, since the proxy signers' private keys are required in the multiproxy multi-signature generation phase, the multi-proxy multi-signature has to be generated by the cooperation of all members in the proxy group.

7. Conclusions

In electronic world, proxy signature is a solution of delegation of signing capabilities. Proxy signatures can combine other special signatures to obtain some new types of proxy signatures. Various type proxy signatures are important in many applications. In this paper, we proposes a new ID-based multi proxy signature is a solution of delegation of signing capabilities. Proxy signatures can combine other special signatures to obtain some new types of proxy signatures.

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Toan Nguyen Duc, Graduated Master Degree in 2015. Current College of Food Industries. Studying for PhD in Thai Nguyen University. Research area: Security and confidential information.